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THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Functions of theory.
Theory and "theorizing" in international relations serves a
purpose similar to that in other branches of the social sciences
of superimposing a sense of order upon data that otherwise would
be disorderly. The building of theory in international relations_
makes-it possible to explain how international systems arid processes may operate and provides the basis for developing laws
which will explain and predict future behavior by the actors in'
the -international system. By the use of theory~ patterns pan be
ascertained and generalizations articulated in a manner that i~
I

meaningful and fruitful in terms of the varieties of approaches
to the study of the phenomena of international relations. The
I

.

principal function of theory is. to make sense of what would
11

otherwise be inscrutable or unmeaning empirical findings."
{Kaplan, 1964, p. 302.)
Theory cannot introduce order where none exists~ however,
order is not discernible in social phenomena except through the
operation of implicit or explicit theorizing. Theory syst~matizes
and establishes relationships among.variables provitling the basis
for the scientific processes of explanation and prediction. Only
by mearis of theory can w·e explain how the international· system
operates and how we may expect actors to behave within the system.
Rudner s definition is quite appropriate: "A theory is a system1
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atitally related set of statements, i,ncluding some lawlike generalizations, that is empirically testable~''

(Rudner, 1966, p 10,

Rudner's it~lics.)
What-is meant by saying that the statements, of·a
certain set of statements, are systematically related
in the sense relevant to our present concerns? Almost
anyone who reaches the age of reason in Western society
has at least an inkling of the import of the term. We
;>

are all ·familiir wit~ the view that it is not the business of science merelj to collect unrelate~, haphazard
. disconhected bits of information; that it is an ideal
of science to give an organized account of the universe
--to connect, to fit together in relations of subsump-_
tion the statements embodying the knowledge that has
been acquired. Such organization is a necessary condi· tion for the acc_omplishment of two·of science's chief
functions, explanation and prediction. But the sort
of systematic relatedness exemplified among the statements of scientific theories is deductive relatedness. Accordingly, to the extent that a theory has
· been fully articulated in some formulation, it will
achieve an explicit deductive development and inter'

'

rt lationship of the statements it encompasses!
1

(Rudner, 1966, p 11, Rudner's italics.)
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Deduction, induction lnd retroduction. There is much support in the literature for the conclusion
that scientific theory is deductive; for example, Spence's ·statement that "Theories of physics are constructions which serve primarily tci integrate or organize into a single deductive· system
sets of empirical laws whic:h previously were unrelated . . .

11

-{Quoted in Kaplan, 1964, p 302.2.)- A similar formulation is
presented by'Hall:

11

••••

a theory is-a systematic deductive

derivation of the secondary principles· of observable phenomena
from a relatively small number of primary principles or postulates,
much as the secondary principles of theorems or geometry are
ultimately derived as a logical hierarchy from a few original definitions and primary principles called axioms. II (Hull,
1943, p 2-3.)

Hansen argues that the formulation of the pri-ncipal physical
laws (such as those of motion~ thermodynamics, electromagnetism,_
' etc.) have been explained in two different ways: first, _it has
been asserted that the laws were developed inductively by means
of observing the phenomena and arriving .at the articulated theories
which explained and predicted such phenomenal behavior.

11

A second

account tre·ats these laws as high-level hypotheses in a hypotheticodeductive system.

11

(Hansen, 1958; p 1q.) The latter~ Hansen argues,

describes physical theory more completely and more satisfactorily than
did explanation by the induction-by-enumeration method.

Hansen argues

that physicist~ do not start from hypotheses, they start from data~
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By the time a law has been. fixed 1nto a [hypothetico-deductive]
system, really original physical thinking is over. The ped.estrian
process of deducing observation statements from hypotheses comes
only after the physicist sees that the hypothesis will at least
explain the initial data requiring explanation. (Hansen, 1958, pp. 70-1.)
Peirce argues that nei'ther induction nor deduction are devices
for bu1lding theory so much as they are devices for testing
theory.

Induction according to this view sets out with a theory
11

and it measures the degree of concordance of that theory with fact.
It never can ori"ginate any idea whatever~

No more can deduction.

!

All the ideas of science come to it by the way of .Abduction
[Retroduction]. Abduction consists in studying· facts and devising
a theory to explain them.

.

Its only justification is that if we

are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way.
Abductive and inductive reasoning are utterly irreducible,
either to the other or to Deduction, or Deduction to either of
them' • . • . Deduction proves that something must
- be; induction
'

'

shows that :Something actually is operative; Abduction merely
suggests that something may be.

11

(Quoted by Hansen, 1958, p 85.).

As Hansen demonstrates, the logical processes of deduction,
induction and retroduction are not mutually exclusive.

Given a

body' of data, we might prove conclusively by deduction th~t
x

=

2(ab)2; we may demonstrate inductively that 2(ab) 2 is a

j
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function of x; we may hypothesize retroductively that any 2(ab) 2
is a function of x.

□-eduction

and induction are limited by the

data-.,. one cannot logically deduce or induce in the absence of
the data.

We cannot identify votingpatterns in American elections

short of collecting statistics and drawing statistical inferences
(induction).

Once established, we can determine the extent of

deviation from voting patterns by mean·s of deduction.· Having
identified patterns and tested some hypotheses, we may formulate
some generalizations retroduttively about voting patterns in
democratic polities~
Formalization .
.-

Obviously,· deductive, inductive, and retroductive (abductive)
reasoning pertain in the social and behavioral sciences as well
-

as in the physical and biological sciences~· That which distinguishes the·latter from the former is not the nature of inquiry
so much as it is the degree of formalization found in the various
disciplines.

"Full formalization" exists when theories "are

formulated as c::ompletely articulated deductive systems." (Rudner;
1966, p 11.) The physical sciences tend to be highly formalized,
the biological sciences less so and the social and behavioral
sciences tend to be only partially formalized.
Atheory, in a substantially formalized system,
includes as constituents (1) an uninterpreted or formal
calculus which provides frir syntactical invariance in
the _system,. (2) a set of semantic rules of interpreta-
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tion which assign some determinate empiric_al meanings
to the formal calculus thereby relating it to an
evidential or empirical base, and (3) a model for the
uninterpreted calculus, in terms of more or less
familiar conceptual or visualizable materials, which
illustrates the relationships between variables in
structural form, an alternative interpretation of the
same" calculus of which the theory itself is an
interpretation.

(Gregor~ 1968, p 425.)

Becau.se they are partially formalized systems, the s_ocial sciences
do not lend themselves to developing the degree of linguistic and
logical precision that is to be found in a more highly formalized
system such as physics.

However, as Kaplan argues, the distinction

may not be so much one between the disciplines as between the varieties and types of theories that are developed in the social
and physical sciences.

Valtdation of theories ts more readily

ach,eved in the physical sciences than in the social sciences

.

because ambiguity is more readily accepted in the latter than in
for former. ~regor argues very effectively, as does Rudner, that
scientific inquiry and theory building can proceed in the social
sciences desp1te the apparent diffictilties and limitations so long
as the scholar is careful and precise in the articulation of
_hypothPses and in the assertion of theoretical interrelationships.
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Partially formalized systems lack, in varying measure,
the logical and linguistic precision afforded by full or
- extensive forma 1i za tion and are consequently suspect.
This cannot be construed to mean that scientific inquiry
in areas where formalization has not been achieved must
cease until such time a:s extensive or exhaustive formal
systematization is-forthcoming. Significant empirical
generalizations and a wealth of descriptive material have
been the ~roduct of dili~~~t enterprise in the partially
or minimally formalized sciences.

All that can .be

legitimatelY implied by the recognition that a di sci pl ine (
is only partially or minimally formaliz~d is that selfconscious efforts should be made to identify sources of
error--vagueness, ambiguities, reifications and tense
obscurities--and the equivocations and vacuities that are
their too frequent _consequences.

{Gregor, p 426.)

Largely as a result of such partial formalization, historically
there has been relatively little incrementalism in the social and
-

-

behavioral sciences as· compared to the biological and physical :
sciences.

In the former it takes special care to identify and

evaluate those properties of one theory which are transferable to
another. This is not the case in highly formalized disciplines.
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Discovering that the earth was round sufficed to demonstrate that
previous theories relating to the earth as being flat were no longer
valid.

The distinction may be summarily described with reference

to Nils Bohr's distinction between trivial and profound truths.
Trivial truths were, to Bohr, those for which the negation was
obvious--establishing 'the truth proves contradictory concepts to
be false,

Profound truths were those for which the negations were

also profoundly true because they could not be disproved experimentally or empirically. the more highly formalized the discipline,
the more it will be concerned with trivial truths; i.e., the
development of theories and their empirical validation serve to
demonstrate the falsity of previously held incompatible theories.
In the social sciences frequently the development and empirical
testing of theories serves to shed greater light than was previously
present but does not in most cases disprove previous theories.
Incrementalism and universalism.
The social sciences, then, have tended to become cluttered with
great bodies of theories of varying degrees of explicitness or
comprehensiveness. The cluttered nature of international relations
theories is only in part a function of the profundity of the
discipline's concerns. Of perhaps greater importance are the lack
of incrementalism and universalism present in most theories in the
field.

Incrementalism in the physical sciences results in replica-

tion of experiments by succeeding generations of students and, as
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a function of replication, in the c.onstaht reexamination of all
aspects of the experimental design:

fromthe framing of hypotheses

through the methodofogy of the research to the findings.

Given the

essential formalization of those disciplines, such replication and
reexamination can be pursued ad infinitum. The constraints that
are imposed upon scholars of the field by having their work subjected
to constant testing and retesting meahs that previous theories must
be reinforced to be retained.

If they are not borne out in the

replications something must be wrong with the theories. Thus,
Kepler, by careful reexamination of Tycho Brahe's mapping of the
'

circular. orbit of Mars, ·found that Brahe I s theory was in error.
As a result, Kepler discovered the elliptical orbit of Mars and,
by extension, of the other planets in the solar system.
This was a physical discovery. Since the same
physical conditions obtained throughout the solar.system,
the same equations ought to explain other planetary
revolutions as well. fhese three great explicantia a~e
the well-known result:

(a) that planetary orbits are

elliptical with the sun in their corrmon focus (1609),.
(b) that they describe around the sun areas proportional
to their times of passage (1609), (c) that the squares
cf the times of their revolutions. are proportional to the
cubes of their greater axes, or their mean distances from
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the sun (1610)~ These are most import&nt in the
history of astronomy. They supplied the material
for Newton's retroduction [abduction] to the.law
-of universal gravitation.

(Hansen, p 84.)

The other major distinguishing feature of the theories in
international relations from those in the biological and physical
sciences is the universalism of most international relations
theories.

This is not to stat~ that universalism is not present

in biological and physical theories-~the illustration ju~t cited
is evidence of universalis~ at its best._ But where universalism
in the biological and physical -sciences is retroductively arrived at,
universalism in-the social sciences_tend to be arrived at through
intuition and insight. To be sure Galileo,. Newton or Kepler made
effective use of intuition and insight but did not confuse those
techniques with observation and experimentation.

Universalism in

the social sciences often follows from intuition fed by loosely
drawn analogies which all ~oo. often substitute for observation.
Univefsalism should not be avoided in the social and
behavioral sciences but~ rather, it should be encouraged; however, that encouragement should include the insistence upon
the relevance of universal -theories to the body of experimental
and empirical data which is available for examination. The
value Jf all theorizing rests principally upon the contribution

made by it to the incremental accretion .of universal generalizations.

Short of this we may understand the parts better than we

have in-the past but we may not be far along in understanding the
whole which.is different from the:sum of its parts.

11

To be sure,

theory will not generate new laws by explaining old ones till we
have old ones to be e~plained. 11

..

(Kaplan p 303.)

Knowledge grows not only by accretion and the
replacement of dubious elements by more sound ones
but aJso by digestion, the remaking of the old
cognitive materials into the substance of a new
theory.

Hierarchial theories are typically

improved by replacing some of their postulates by
others, or by formulating a new set from which we
can dedu~e the old one and other significant
consequences as well.

In the case of concatenated

theories the pattern is sometimes- extended, but more
often it is changed in ways that reveal it to be a
fragment of_pattern.
11

a larger

and usually quite different

The realiza~ion.that some-of the so-called

nebulae 11 are not really nebulous but-enormously

d·;stant.galaxies of stars in their own right not

only generated new-conceptions of stellar universe,
·but also changed signifi~antly the conception of o~r.
own Milky Way.

(Kaplan pp 304-5.)

Kaplan argues that knowledge grows ·by way of extension and
by way of intension~

Growth by ex tens ion is the familiar bui 1ding-

-b 1ock mode of- learning. Thus subtraction follows addition and
multiplication .precedes division.

"In growth by intension a

partial explanation of a·whole region is made more and more
adequate."

(Kaplan; p 305;)

Extension and intension are involved

in all advances in theory in that each additional increment would
have to conform to a closed system of thought.

rn·order to fit,

its role would·have to have been preordained much as a piece in
a jigsaw puzzle will normally fit one and only one place in the
puzzle.

Kaplan quotes Hutten as saying that growth in science

"is not simply adding on units to something already existing
.that remains unchanged in the process. The whole stru~ture, the
skeleton, changes with growth even though it remain_s recognizably
similar to what it has been. The system of science would not be
flexible unless its structure could change with increasing
knowledge." . (Kaplan, p 305-6.)
The principal significance of theory lies in the direction of
provic'ing guidance for action.

" . • . the guidance·which theory

provides is chiefly and most directly for scientific activity-forming concepts and laws, conductlng experiments, making measure-

ments, providing explanations and p~edictions." · (Kaplan, p 310.)
These are the properties of theory and of scientific inquiry. The
degree of formalization does not determine the scientific nature
of an enterprise-.;.that which is formalized may be more explicit
and more precise lending itself to a ~reater degre~ of incrementalization in research._ But formalized systems are not necessarily more
suitable to theory and theorizing than partially formalized systems
_even though experimentation and observation may be more carefully
controlled in the former.
I

. "Formalize as much as you can" might be sound advice
if, e~g., the ·only goal of the scientist were the
a6hievement of th~ most rigorous possible formulation
of his theories.

However, he is equally, if not more,

'

concerned with a plurality of other goa 1s, among them
predicti~n, control, and. the experimental testing of his

I

theories. Attempts to acheive great rigor in the formu'.'"
lation of a theory may conflict with the achievement of
some of these other goals.

Furthermore, at a given

stage of a theory's development insistence on great
rigor may be stultjfying; its premature achievement
may even tend to constrict inquiry.

Fina1''1y, the

energies
d'sproportionate allocation of scientific
'
.
available to this one facet of the scientific enterprise

.

I
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might result in the neglect of other equa~ly important
aspects of that enterprise~

Of to~rse, these ~tructures

-apply pre-eminently to the scientist who must be the .·
initial formulator of scientific theory. They do not
· apply to the philosopher or logician who may be interested· in the di.fferent task of rigorously reformulating
theories.

( Rudner p 52.) .

Validation of theories~
Of critical importance is determining-the validity of theories
for certainiy each theory is not as valid as every other theory.
The queition concerns ho~ to decide which theories ·deserve to be
or ~hould be applied, published, e~hibited, and investigated. The
mere ·fact that a theory is adduced is not sufficient reason to
warrant giving it major ~onsideration.

Philosophers of stience talk

of.three types of norms which may be used to validate theories:
Norms of correspondence ot $emantical norms, norms of coherence or
syntactical norms, and pragmatic or functional norms.
We apply norms of correspondence in order to determine whether
or not the theory fits the facts.

A theory is true if it explai.ns

how things work and/or if predictions made on the basis of the theory
are in fact fulfilled.

Further, a theory must correspond to an informed

or intelligent view of related data.

It must make sense in~terms

.of other_theories and must jibe with that which we know.

In other

words the norms of correspondence seek to adduce that the theory ·
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conforms to the data and to previously formulated theories.
Norms·of correspondence seek to determine whether or not a
theory is capable of being integrated with related or relevant theories.
If a theory stipulates a condition which, a1though plausible; can
be accepted only if other theories are rejected, there is a prima
facie case against the theory. Theories of telepathy are incapable
of being integrated with theories of the transmission of information
since. telepathy is unaffected by distance which affects all other
forms of transmission. rrhe test of correspondence cannot disprove
telepathy but it reduces it to a more speculative position and one
which permits a scientist to reject it beca.use of its inconsistency
with oiher known theories.
The norms.of coherence, are simplicity and symmetry. The simplicity
that is desired is both descriptive and inductive.

Descriptive simplicity

means that_the description itself is presented in the simplist possible
way. The more descriptively simple-a theory the greater the convenience in handling it.

Inductive simplicity is concerned with

simplicity in what is being described and the extent to which it is
achieved may promote the best development of the theory~ The require.

-

-

.

ment of inductive simplicity does not mean reducing every inquiry
to its most simple possible form; however, it means reducing the
number of variables that are dealt With in the theory to the smallest
number that do not oo violence to that which is being described. As
_ will be noted later, the.application of some psychological .theories
der,ving from the study of interpersonal behavior to international
negotiation calls into question the norms of coherence in that too
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much simplicity is frequently introduced in the description of the
bargaining process at the international l~vel.
The justification might be given for the norm of
simplicity that the norm does not condemn complexity
but only imposes upon it the burden of proof. We are
to introduce a complicated- factor Only if we have,
reason to expect error from its omission, and not if
we just lack a reason for expecting error from the
simpler treatment~ On thi~ interpretation, the norm
of simplicity presents itself as another form of Occam's
razor:

variables are not to be multiplied beyond

necessity.

Here there is no metaphysical assumption

about Nature's preferences, but an appeal to the same·
considerations of convenience that justify the choice of
descriptive simplicity.

Popper has urged an even
-

-

stronger justification:. the more complicated the theory
-the less it says, for· the harder it is
, to falsify-the more likely it is that something in the theory
will eithe~ make recalcitrant facts irrelevant because
they fail to satisfy certain conditions, or else
reinterpret them so that they are no longer disconfirming.
(The Marxist theory of history is a good example, I think.')
"There'is no need," Popper says, "for us to assume a
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'principle of economy'.of thought' or anything of the
kind.

Simple statements, if knowledge is our object~_
i

are to be prized more: highly than less simple ones
bec~use their empirical content i~ greater; and
·because they are better testable. 11 A11 things considered perhaps the best methodological cour.se as to
·. the norm of simplicity is Whitehead's:
simplicity and distrust it. 11

"Seek

(Kaplan, p 318.)

\

Theory shouldbe esthetically appealing. The closer a theory can
approximate symmetry, the more appealing it should- be. This is not
.

.

to argue that a theory should be judged in terms o·f its beauty but
that.the degree to whfch tt ha~ esthetic ap~eal is a measure-of the
precision, clarity~ and simplicity that have been achieved.
Finally, theory should conform to certain pragmatic or functional
norms.

This is_the test as to how effective it is for scientific

purposes. A theory may be very useful insofar as its contribution
to improving scientific procedures even if it does not improve the
current state of scientific knowledge. This is not.to argue for
methodo.logy for methodology's sake, but that if the theory that
_is developed improves our understanding of the discipline, it
may make as signal a contribution to science as the knowledge itself
would have contributed.

Theory is heuristic.

Indeed_ it may well

be that the heuristic is the greatest contribution in·that theory
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helps us to phrase questions more than to answer them.

By means·

of theory, we are able to formulate hypotheses which are worthy
of investigation, which promise to yield greater rewards for
the inquiry. A theory provides an additional service.in helping
to explain old laws and to predict new ones. Thus theory can be
"

used very effectively to reexamine previously studied information
in an attempt to arrive at greater understanding of what occ~red
and what might have transpired had some parts of the condition
been ·different.

"In the science of physics at least it would
·-

.

·;

-:

almost be more accurate to·say that we believe our laws
I

because they are consequences of our theories than to say we
believe our theories because they predict and explain true
laws!" '(Campbell quoted by Kaplan, p 321.),
Models.
· Much of international relations research in recent years
has been concerned with .building models which purport to represent the international system or portions thereof. Model~ of
various;types arid styles have been employed With varying degrees
of accuracy, appropriateness and utility. Six styles of models.
I

.

abound in the literature:

First is the literary style whi,ch is

represented by the great body of biographical and anecdotal
lit~rature including most.of the materials available in diplomatic history, .memoirs, and many of the,publis_hed policy
critiques.

Examples of such literary modular materials would
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include Nicolson on diploma~/, (Nicolson, 1964.) (Ikle, 1964) on negotiation
and the spate of studies of John F. Kennedy (e.g., Sorenson, 1965,
Schlesinger, 1965). Journalists typically employ models of the
literary style. Such models tend to be vaguely drawn, imprecise,
and lacking in rigor; however, there is a narrative quality which
generally eludes writers of more rigorous and carefully drawn
models.

Because of their lack of precision ~nd their reliance

upon linquistic as .distinguished from symbolic elements in the
model, literary models are less susceptible to replication and
retesting than extra-linguistic models and hence have little to
commend them in terms of the process of incrementally increasing
understanding of international political processes.
The second style to be noted is theacademic style. This is
distinguished.by way of being more abstract and more generic than
models of the literarystyle. There is much more .of an attempt at
being precise but since the style is verbal it is no less ambiguous
than th~ languag~. The precisibn that is sought in the academic.
style is verbal precision rather than ·operational precision--it seeks
not to prepare the way for empirical validation. Hegel, Marx, Toynbee
and Spengler employed the academic style in their historical systematizations, as did Adam Smith and Milton Freedman in their classical
economics.
Th~ third style is eristic in fts requirement for the statement
of specific propositions which are subjected to proof. The emphasis
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is upon "deductive relationships, logical derivations from propositions previously established or explicitly assumed, though proofs
are sketched rather than rigorously laid out" {Kaplan, p 260.).

Much

of the work of behavioral -psychologists as represented by Pavlov, Skinner,
and Osgood, for example, is eristic in style. The eristic style depends
upon the employment of experimental and stat_istical data for validation
rather than relying upon verbal validation.
The fou~th style is symbolic with its emphasis upon nonverbal
devices for representation. The model is couched entirely in mathematical rather than linguistic terms and all work on the model is
conducted symbo 1i cal ly rather than verbally.

Econometrics, psychometrics,

sociometrics, game theory, and decision theory represent symbolic
styles of models. _Among the various styles of models, the
symbolic are the least ambiguous and the most precise.

Riker's

three-person game is a good illustration of the symbolic style as
is Kent's model of bargaining.

(Riker, 1967; Kent, 1967.)

Fifth is the postulational style which is in some respects a
variant of the symbolic style. Where the symbolic style depends
up·on mathematics for its proof, the postulational style depends
upon semantical logic.
Emphasis is on the system as a whole, bound together by
":he chains of logical derivation. Rules for such derivations
are explicitly formulated and applied. The foundation
upon which the ·whole system is erected is a set of
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propositions laid down to serve in just·this way: These
are the postulates; often they are also called

11

axiorris

11
,

though in more strict usages this term· is reserved for
postul~tes whose truth can be established without appealing to anything ·beyond pure logic and mathematics. , In
general, postulates have an empirical content, and-their
~~'.:;-:,,

.

trt1th is dependent on matt'ers of fact. · From the postulates
theorems are derived, whose verification indirectly:vali;.,
dates t~e postulates by- which theY ar·e proved.

Interest

l

centers on the indepen·dence of the postulates from one
another (none of them is a theorem of the system constituted
by the re~t), and on their mutual consistency (a propo'

sition and its negation cannot both be derived from the
set). What is wanted is the simplest sets which will
suffice for the derivation· of the theorems in Which
they are interested, one which will allow for elegant
proofs of the important propositions about the subject)

matter. The postulational style is likely to be less demanding
of the extensive measurement, less bound by variou.s quantitative.
scales.

(Kaplan, p 261~)

Morton Kaplan's System and Process in International Relations is an
excellent example of the postulational style, as is Richard Rosecrance s
1

Action and Reaction in International Politics.
Rosecrance, 1963.)

(Kaplan, 1957;

Sixth is the formal style which is similar to postulational
but is not related to any specific empirical content.

"The

difference is that here the key terms are not given any interpretation; there is

no

reference to any specif1c empirical content.

'

What is remarkable is that the validity of the derivations is not
dependent upon any such content, but only upon the pattern of
relationships holding among the symbols themselves~-hence the
designation formal."

(Kaplan, 1964,_ p 262.) Newtomb's A-B-X

phenomenal .system model of communication is illustrative of the
formal $tyle, as is Fedder's derivative model of communication
in negotiation.

(Newcomb, 1958; Fedder, 1964. )

Of the various styles of models, it would appear that the
eristic, the symbolic and the postulational have the most to
offer to international relations theory. This statement holds
true only if one agrees with the premise advanced earlier that
scholarship and understanding are advanced as a function of
incremental additions to the body of knowledge about international affairs. The scientific study of international relations
depends upon accumulating studies which have empirical relevance
and whose findings are transferable to other studies so that we
can develop a body of lawlike generalizations which stand up to
symbolic and logical testing.
M(1del s are of utility if and only if they can contribute to an
expansion of our understanding of a theory or process or of some
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phenomenon. Th~ term has been used and {misused) in many ways but
as I am employing it, a model is an artificial or abstract representation of a systemic relationship adduced by a theory.
that

11

•••

Rudner says

a model for a theory consists of an alternative inter-

pretation of the same calculus of which the theory itself is an interpretation.1130 The model then must possess the same logical properties
as does the theory; trt is, it must be isomorphic to the theory.

The

model need not reproduce all of the conditions of the referent. The
conditions that are ilportant at this point are structural and not
contextual.
In addition to being isomorphic t6 their referent systems, models
can be isomorphic to tne another. They are isomorphic if the structural

_properties in one ~d~l hold for the second model. The iso~rphism that
is required here is o[lyin terms of the structural properties of each
of the models and not with respect to how the systems behave.

Conceivably,

for example, a model ·fa molecule may be isomorphic to one of the solar
systems.

This does nbt say that a molecule behaves in a similar manner

to the ·solar system but that the relationship among the various parts of
the molecule is isomorphic to the relationships between the various parts
of the solar model.
More specifically models are isomorphs of one another.
Both systems have the same structure, in the sense that
·,\lhenever a relation holds between two elements of one system
a corresponding relation holds between the corresponding elements
of the other system. The systems need not stand in any casual connection,

.,

!
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for what is requi~ed is only that the rel~tions correspond,
and to satisfy this requirement it is enough that we
can put them into correspondence, that is think of
them as corresponding. Then, whether a system does or
does not show a certain pattern of its own internal
relations is plainly quite independent of what the
other system shows.

If there is an isomorphism, the

systems significantly resemble one another only in
their structural properties, additional resemblances,
if any, being irrelevant.

(Kaplan, 1964, p 263-4.)

Analogies.
The isomorphism of a model is limited to the structural or
logical properties of the system.

If we want to c·ompare the

behavior of one model to another--that is to discuss similarities
in the content rather than ·in the structure, we are concerned with
the analogical as distinguished from the logical characteristics
of the system. Where models are concerned with structure,
analogies are concerned with behavior. Analogies may be drawn
even where the models are quite dissimilar.r Analytically, we
',

might discover that a system or a part of a system exhibits a
behavioral pattern that is isomorphic to the behavioral pattern of
another system or part of a system.
To take an example, the assertion that an automobile
eats gasoline can be taken to be purely metaphorical.

'

·I

I
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But in a certain sense it is literally true, because
the burning of gasoline liberates energy which propels
the car in quite the same way as the oxidation of
food liberates energy which activates the muscles.
Comparison of social and political systems to
living organisms has been frequently dismissed as
metaphorical and naive.

But this i~ so only if the

sole purpose of the comparison is to evoke a suggestive
image.

If real isomorphisms can be traced between the

functioning of living organisms and of political systems
(e.g., self-maintenance, growth, evolution) then the comparison is more than ~llegorical.

It carries elements

of real "homologies quite as the analogy between an
11

engine burning fuel and an organism digesting food.
(Rapoport,. 1966 p 139.)
The analogy in this illustration holds because the esse-ntial
properties with which we are concerned are present in both cases--in the oxidation of food to provide energy and in the burning of
gasoline to provide energy.

If the relational properties were not

isomorphic, no analogy would exist.

The great difficulty presented

by Dean Rusk's assertion that the situation in v·ietnam in the mid
1960 s was analogous to the situation in Europe in the late 1930 s
1

1

rests precisely in the lack of relational isomorphism of the two
situations.

It is not enough to assume triit since there are some

i
I

i
I

I
:I
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apparent similarities in two situations, that an analogy may be
drawn.

The analogy is valid if and only if the behavior exhibited

is isomorphic in fact and not that it approaches isomorphism or that
there are soine isomorphic features that are present.
...

An additional limitation in the use of analogy must be asserted •
An analogy (or a model) can only explain the analogy (or the model).

-.r

The dynami<: relationship between A and-8, fo·r example, may be
discovered to be analogical to the behavior between·c and D.

But

knowing that A and B behave 1in a certain fashion doe_s not tell us
that C and D beha_ve in the same way.

Analogy will not stand in

I

place of empirical or experimental research.

On the basis of

empirical and experimental research we may find that analogies exist.
Having discovered analogies between two models or two.systems, we
can formulate hypotheses which when investigated.may lead to the
discovery of further analogies.
.

.

.

Thus analogies and models perform

)

.

the heuristic function of helping to prepare for further scientffic
research.

Neither models nor analogies can prove anything concerning

the structural or behavioral properties of their referents, just
as a 1aboratory experiment cannot prove a theory.

They can·, however,

demonstrate that certain structural or behavioral properties are
manifest in the referent so that we can say that "since the model
behaves in this fashion it is reasonable to ~xpe_ctthe referent
system to behave in the same fashion since it is isomorphic to the
model. 11

,·
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As heuristic deviries, analogi~s can assist the social scientist
in explaining and predicting social and behavioral phenomena; however, analogies cannot form the basis for such explanat·ion and
pr.ediction~ By way of analogy, he may discover new avenues of.
ihvestig~tion·and fresh approaches to the solution of hii problem,
but the hard content of explanation of behavior must develop
from observation or testing of the behavior itself. And predictions
must
. develop out of the past experience of phenomena. The development of policy prescriptions based upon explanation and pre_diction
.

arising out of analogy is always dysfunctional and is potentially
catastrophic.
.

Knowing that the human digestive system requires

significant quantities of water to perform its functions·, the
..

I

'

•

adding of significant quantities

of water

gasoline tank would not be indicate~.

to an automobile's

Similarly,.eve~ if there

were·an analogy between Vietnam in the mid 1960's and Central
Europe Jn the 1ate 1930' s ~ the po 1icy responses ·adopted in the
latter would not on that account apply in the former. The_social scientist must steel himself against the temptation of substituting analogy for inquiry, and substituting a model
for reality. At the risk of being repetitious, it is clear that
the correct employment of models and analogies facilitates research
· in fou:~ ways:

First, they.help us identify and organize relevant

data and discard irrelevant data.

Second, as a function of their
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explicitness, they permit researchers to build up.on and criticize
work of preceeding researchers, thereby promoting incrementalism.
Third, they encourage the development of explicit definitions of
concepts in a manner that minimizes vagueness and ambiguousness.
And fourth, they promote the framing of postulates and hypotheses
which can be measured, tested, classified, etc.~ thereby facilitating their confirmation or disconfirmation.

,\

,I

!
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